Criminology in Latin America: A dialogue with Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni.

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Introduction

To discuss criminology in Latin America we cannot avoid many important names of our recent history. Those who, from these godforsaken lands, had the courage to be exponents of critical thinking when it was really dangerous for their own lives. Many critical criminologists of this region were direct victims of the various genocides that afflicted the entire continent and their books were burned and censored.

From among many of those who are responsible for having turned the page of the history of positivist criminology in this region, we have chosen one of the most important jurists and criminologists in Latin America for the last four decades.

Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni (Buenos Aires, 1940) is one of the most famous jurists and criminologists in the Spanish-speaking world. His trajectory in criminal law with German dogmatic influence can be traced back to the 1970s, when he published a substantial five-volume Treatise on Criminal Law. With that book, which served as a manual for law students, all jurists throughout Latin America were trained in law schools. There is no jurist in the Spanish or Portuguese-speaking world who has not studied from his books. He also taught criminology for the faculties of psychology and sociology in Buenos Aires and Mexico. He currently has countless books widely distributed in many languages such as Spanish, Portuguese, German and Italian. Academically, he has received more than forty honorary PhDs from the most prestigious universities in the region and in Europe. His teaching extended to many universities in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Costa Rica, but he always primarily taught at the University of Buenos Aires, where for several decades he chaired its Department of Criminal Law and Criminology. His formative years were spent in Mexico, Germany and Italy. And specifically in criminology, his most direct influences were Alessandro Baratta, Massimo Pavarini (of the Bologna school), Rosa del Olmo (Venezuela) and Louk Hulsman (Rotterdam).

The influence of Zaffaroni’s work and critical thinking in Latin America spans four decades, especially in the legal world of criminal law, but also in the institutional reforms of most of the countries in the region, whose penal codes, penitentiary laws and even constitutions were developed by the tireless work of Prof. Zaffaroni. His most important work for critical criminological thought was “In search of the lost penalties” (Zaffaroni, 1989), where he discussed the abolitionist approaches of northern Europe that were in vogue at the time, especially with his Master Louk Hulsman. In this work he postulates an integrative critical theory for Latin American criminal law and criminology, taking into account the structural reality and economic dependence of the countries of the region, the degradation of the official institutions of punishment and the absence of critical views in a region that was emerging from genocides produced by the State’s own punitive forces. The rest of his works on criminology are “Criminology, an approach from the margin”, “The speech of the dead” and “The New Critical Criminology”.

In 2009 Zaffaroni was distinguished with the Stockholm Criminology Prize for his widespread research on state crimes in contemporary criminology. This led to the publication of some of his texts in English-speaking journals. A volume devoted entirely to his work and thought is currently being prepared for English readers.

Zaffaroni was engaged with real reforms to the criminal justice system, that is why he also occupied political positions in Argentina and in the 90’s he was the Director of the United Nations Institute for the Prevention of Crime in Latin America (ILANUD, Costa Rica). He also served for forty years in various judicial positions in Argentina, becoming a Supreme Court Judge and currently a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

For twenty years I have had the great privilege of considering myself a disciple of Prof. Zaffaroni, with whom I have worked both academically and judicially. He directed my PhD thesis and together with
his tireless itinerant journey throughout the region, we have traveled to teach and lecture at numerous universities. We have edited several journals together and written books jointly, and I can testify of his intellectual quality but first and foremost of his unparalleled human quality.

For this special issue of Criminological Encounters I decided to ask Prof. Zaffaroni some of the basic guidelines for understanding criminology in Latin America.

Matías Bailone: Dear Raúl, according to your historical perspective, how did critical criminology originate in Latin America?

In other words, how did critical criminological thinking from the Anglo-Saxon world reach our region? There are many critical public statements that are made by great criminological thinkers of our region at the beginning of the 80s, although more linked to the concrete politics of Latin America. There are also concrete needs that many critical jurists had, regarding the real functioning of the punitive system in the region at that time.

Which of these circumstances gave rise to critical criminology in Latin America?

Raúl Zaffaroni: Jurists in general did not have much to do with the beginnings of critical criminology in our region. It fundamentally permeated through a series of dissident criminologists of positivism, who began to read and study critical Anglo-Saxon texts, such as those of Rosa del Olmo, Aniyar de Castro, Roberto Bergalli, Juarez Cirino dos Santos, Emiro Sanoval Huertas, Mauricio Martínez, Emilio García Méndez, and Juan Guillermo Sepúlveda, perhaps forgetting other names; but in general, the world of criminal law jurists was a little disconcerted by the statements of criticism.

Perhaps one of the first encounters between critical criminologists and criminal law jurists took place when we were conducting research on 'The Criminal System and Human Rights' at the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, in the early 1980s.

Criminal law in the region was still plagued by the debate between 'causalism' and 'finalism' (a discussion on German criminal dogmatism transplanted to our region) and its practitioners were rather perplexed by criminological criticism. What took place in San José was interesting because problems of human rights were discussed. It was too much to try and bring these concepts (selectivity, stereotypes, labelling, etc.) into a dogmatic discussion that moved between Edmund Mezger and Hans Welzel. Of course, there were progressive criminal law experts, such as the Chileans Eduardo Novoa Monreal and Juan Bustos Ramírez. The Colombian Alfonso Reyes was himself open to these new ideas, but harmonising dogmatics with critical criminology and with sociology itself, also the more traditional sociological approaches, was very difficult.

M.B.: Raúl, tell me a little bit about the spirit that prevailed in those meetings or congresses in the 1970s and 1980s in all the countries of the region. Was it the revolutionary spirit of the 'new man' or was it a very academic view of the subject?

R.Z.: These were the years of the dictatorship and the transition to constitutional governments throughout the region. I did not participate in the first meetings of critical criminology groups in Venezuela. It was not only out of fear of reprisals from the Argentinean dictatorship, but it had something to do with my personal academic history. My original training in criminology, especially in Mex-
ico, with Alfonso Quiróz Cuarón, was predominantly aetiological, although he was neither a racist nor a pure biologist. But it was a criminology focused mainly on the 'causes of crime'.

Back in Argentina, specifically as a criminal judge at Villa Mercedes and as a professor at the Catholic University of La Plata, aetiological criminology made 'a lot of noise' from my perspective, since it had nothing to do with what I saw every day. I realised, in actuality, that it didn’t explain anything to me, and that there was a huge contradiction between what I thought in ideological terms and all of that. This was a contradiction that I also saw in Quiróz Cuarón, and in most of those who cultivated that criminology, who, by the way, were not fascists or colonialists or anything like that. It would be a mistake to see them all as such, because only a few were.

That’s why I closed the books on criminology and focussed entirely on criminal law, went to the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg, West Germany, published the *Theory of Crime*, and then dedicated myself in the following years – the '70s – to writing the five volumes of my *Criminal Law Theory*, in juridical terms according to the German theory.

At the end of the '70s, I reconnected with criminology, and read the critical works of that time. I think that by reading Massimo Pavarini and Dario Melossi for the first time, I formed a complete picture of the era. I resumed my sociological readings. In 1968 I had taught the sociology of law in Veracruz. At the UN Congress in Caracas in 1980, I began to became friendly with Rosa del Olmo. We went to that congress with David Baigún on behalf of the AIDP (International Association of Criminal Law). That was at the time of the dictatorship and Argentina had official representation, which we carefully avoided. Baigún was more experienced than I was in this respect, which gave rise to a very comical original distrust at the time of the first contact with Elíás Carranza.

I continued to work on the five volumes of my *Theory of Criminal Law* that I had begun in 1980, although they were published over the next three years. I had also published the *Theory of Crime* textbook in 1977, but it slowly dawned on me that something wasn’t working in criminal law either; there was criticism that was beginning to ‘make noise’ about what I had written, at least with regard to a good part of it. My textbook was circulating as a left-wing work but I did not feel that this was enough. I began to travel to Brazil as well; the world was opening up to me in Portuguese, and I saw even more contradictions as I got to know Brazilian society better, where, in addition to my previous experience in Mexico, criminal law seemed to me only superficially rational, and with a huge background of irrationality.

The tone of the '70s was confusing. There was a true fusion between academics from countries that were not dictatorships and those exiled from countries under ‘national security’ dictatorships. In the '80s there was a sort of Latin American ‘unveiling’, of course. In those years, contacts with critical thinkers became more frequent, such as at the Medellín Congress, where there was the presence of Alessandro Baratta, Louk Hulsman, and Massimo Pavarini. All these thinkers were easily accessible people, who were modest, and open to conversation and simple dialogue with a confused Latin-American like me.

Obviously, I was quite lost. My training in criminal law was in the original neo-Kantianism (Mezger), but I became an unorthodox finalist realist, but influenced by objective logical structures (Welzel), in interesting dialogue with a liberal Spanish Republican Kantian like Manuel de Rivacoba, my avid readings of the first Heidegger, the original criminological training with Quiróz Cuarón, the experience of formal logic with the ‘mathematical logic model’ in Mexico, Antonio Beristain’s victimological question and now back to sociology and contact with the European forefathers of criticism, all of this was a beautiful stew, ‘puchero’ or ‘feijoada’ that I did not know how to cook very well. But something told me that I had to deepen critical thinking in criminal law.
M.B.: Did the original aetiological training leave you with anything constructive?

R.Z.: That is a good question. Yes, indeed, something was left with me, which has lasted until the present, especially the year I spent in the clinical psychiatry classes of the old asylum of ‘La Castañeda’ with the teacher José Luis Patiño Rojas. Of course I know the limitations of psychiatry and the anti-psychiatric criticisms and so on, but there is something that I learnt and that serves me to this day. To put it bluntly, I learnt that ‘crazy people’ are like us, only without limitations: that is, we all have moments when we get away from reality, but we come back, maybe several times a day, and we are not schizophrenic. There are days when we are more ‘down’, and others when we feel that everything is fine, and that we can take the world by storm, but we are not manic-depressive. On other days we get ‘stuck’ in some idea or fear, we do not digest it well and it dominates us for a while, until we dissolve it, and it goes down the tube, but we are not paranoid. Sometimes we see things that do not exist, animals in the shadows, pyramids on the straight road where we drive. But we realise that they do not exist, or that we deform what we see, or we hear the bell that did not ring, and we are not hallucinating or delusional.

In short, I learnt not to know if it is the ‘crazy’ who lack limitations or if it is us who are the ‘limited crazy’. I confess that I tend to think the latter, although I know very well that it is not convenient to lose too many inhibitions because otherwise you get locked up and ‘stuffed with pills’.

M.B.: Tell me a little about Rosa del Olmo. She was the first to bring the texts of the criminology of social reaction, labelling, and stigmatisation theory to the region and to the Spanish language. Was she the first amphibian academic between the Hispanic and North American worlds? Is it thanks to her that these texts were translated in the early ‘70s?

R.Z.: The fact is that dear Rosita had been trained in Wisconsin and also in England. Each one was marked by its own life history. Rosita was born in Spain, she was the daughter of a feminist woman, a fighter, who took her into exile, and I think she died in France when Rosa was about 12 years old. It is true that thanks to her, the first texts translated in the English language arrived, she discovered the interest in critical criminology in that language, especially in North America.

But Rosa was much more than a criminologist, she was a feminist sociologist, she was interested and wrote above all about women in all the revolutionary movements of those years. With regard to the question of drugs, which she was passionate about, she approached it very specifically from the perspective of women’s involvement. She was undoubtedly the pioneer of feminist critical criminology in our region and, I would say, in Spanish. She did not have the ‘juricentrism’ of the penalist formation, and for that reason she sometimes criticised the Europeans.

Rosa did not go to the United States, but came from there and had to revalidate her degree, as I remember. She was fundamentally a fighter as well as an extraordinary academic.

M.B.: When you wrote In Search of Lost Penalties thirty years ago, you had already published another earlier book on criminology, which were transcriptions of lectures in Venezuela, that you titled An Approach from the Margin. To what extent did you think you were going to dedicate yourself to criminology in the future?
R.Z.: In fact, we penalists are criminology snipers, we get into the social disciplines, in the ‘psi’; in the economy, in political science, we snoop everywhere, but if we are conscious, we do this to understand what we have in our hands and what we do. I don’t know if we are criminologists or if that is being a criminologist. The truth is that I never set out to ‘be’ a criminologist, but to do criminology. It’s something like poetry or history, you can have a degree in literature or history, but you can also write poetry or history without that degree. You may lack some methodology if you want to do criminal sociology, or economic analysis of crime, but there is no one who has all that knowledge. To be a serious criminologist you would need to be a sort of Leonardo Da Vinci, and that doesn’t exist. What I became clearly aware of is that I could not be a criminologist without knowing what happens with punitive power in the real world of social reality to the people, as an elementary responsibility. Much less can I be a judge, or pretend with my writings to dictate a line on jurisprudence to other judges. Normative logic is not enough, every sentence is an act of government or a ‘polis’; it is a political act. How can you exercise political power without knowing what you are doing in reality? You can become an Eichmann.

The Aproximación desde el margen are class notes; they are the result of Zulia’s classes, but also of notes I gave to the students when, following the Argentine dictatorship, I took over the chair of criminology at the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Buenos Aires, where I remained until I left because of my age. I liked that chair very much. As you can see in those pages, I focussed on a critique of positivism and its function in our region. There was no more complete idea, by the way, although I was beginning to understand something about the need to wake up from normativism, and to start from a more realistic basis. I did not want that book to be distributed in Argentina, but in the end, the Colombian publisher did.

M.B.: In your academic and personal bibliographic history did you think that criminology was going ‘to eat’ criminal law, or were you already thinking of the Barattian paradigm of integration (of Alessandro Baratta)?

R.Z.: No, the idea that criminology ‘eats’ criminal law is a very dangerous positivist dream. Today it is back with neurosciences, or rather, with what some try to make neurosciences say, and it seems that they are reviving an unusual dialogue between St. Augustiné and Lombroso, to end up in Lacassagne. From the time we are little, they are going to place something in our frontal or parietal area so that we are not aggressive and become ‘meek’ in the face of power.

I’d like to clarify that this does not cast aspersions on neuroscience in itself, of course. Maybe they will find out if there really are psychopaths. What happens is that biological reductionist aetiological criminology always fell in love with the latest fashion of biology, as it did with endocrinology, for example, but that was a thing of aetiological criminologists. Endocrinology exists and so do our glands, but that has nothing to do with Kretschmer’s simplicities. Then, with less intensity, came the atypical chromosome. They also fell in love with psychoanalysis and produced a criminological literature of lousy psychoanalytic quality, with some exceptions, which does not mean that the unconscious does not exist, of course.

The sciences advance and the hasty aetiological criminologists claim that they are going to ‘cure’ criminals, and criminal law will be superfluous. I do not know how they are going to ‘cure’ the managers of transnationals who practice the great financial organised crimes of our time, nor the local agents we have in our countries. Rather, I believe that some of them may be thinking about how to ‘cure’ those of us who denounce their economic macro-crimes or how to use these methods to thwart the resistance of our peoples. Remember that Lombroso pathologised the anarchists and the Paris Com-
Regarding the integration paradigm, Alessandro Baratta was very pessimistic at the time. I was very sorry not to be able to dialogue with him after digging into the *Malleus Maleficarum* and *the Cautio Criminalis* from the Middle Ages. I could not show him that the first integrated model was clearly that of the *Malleus* and the first critical criminology that of the *Cautio*.

In short, when I was thinking about my book from 30 years ago and I was able to more or less arrange some pieces in my head, I did it impelled by Baratta’s influence. I was not resigned to a criminal law that was not compatible with criminology, understood as the set of data of the ‘being’ of the punitive power; that is, a schizophrenic criminal law enclosed in the normative logic and excluding the real world. The only way I found was to legitimise the legal power of containment, and not the punitive power. And every day I am more convinced, especially in Latin America, where we are the descendants of five centuries of genocidal colonialism. The model of international humanitarian law was useful to me, and I found Tobias Barreto’s concise but accurate lucidity brilliant.

In Europe, criminology – even critical criminology – does not seem to have taken charge of genocide, or of the colonialists who created these states, legitimised by racist criminology, or of what happened in the last world war, considered an unrepeatable Sonderweg. What more noble function can criminal law have than to contain the punitive power that otherwise gets out of control and ends up in genocide?

**M.B.:** In your opinion, are the great criminologists in Latin America always Europeans? I mean, Alessandro Baratta, Louk Hulsman, Massimo Pavarini—to which of these figures do we owe more regarding the processes of knowledge they were researching and developing outside the region? Who became more ‘Latin Americanised’?

**R.Z.:** I believe that none of them became too ‘Latin Americanised’, but they taught us the characteristics that punitive power has in any place and time, that is, the structural ones: selectivity, stereotypes, violence, incapacity to resolve conflicts, and so on. This is the way it is all over the world, in the North and in the South, except that these are exacerbated or attenuated, according to the power framework. We were taught to delegitimise the false premises on which normativist criminal law was based, the dangerous traps of neo-Kantianism, of ethicisation, of normatisation, of elevating logic to ontology. We have learnt a lot from them.

As for the characteristics of punitive power in Latin America, that is the task of our criminology, and it is to a large extent pending. In Europe punitive power is rather ‘formal’, here in our region, the informal punitive power is always more important: torture, extortions, executions without trial, forced disappearances, the autonomous collection of our executive agencies. Ours is a criminal punitive power, tolerated by its ‘formal’ exercise that covers it up. The parallel and unofficial punitive power is not only typical of national security dictatorships, it is common in our societies, it is delinquent but unpunished by the ‘formal’ punitive power that complements it. Europeans do not understand this well, because they do not have that experience.

**M.B.:** What was it like, Raúl, to teach criminal law and criminology at the University of Buenos Aires, or at the Social Museum or wherever, including your Mexican experience in the ’60s, under the positivist paradigm? I mean, it was dominant everywhere, wasn’t it? The shadow of Francisco Laplaza at the University of Buenos Aires was still imposing, or was it only because he had been paid by the dic-
tatorships and the power that really existed in the academic and judicial world?

R.Z.: No, I did not live in the times of the dangerous criminal law, do not suppose that I am that old. When I was a student, I studied for the general part of the criminal law exam with a positivist academic, an old professor named Silva Riestra. I was 18 years old, and I was astonished the question of the open ears, the unbridled forehead, the prominent chin, the “Vilella skull”, the atavism, the whole theory of Lombrosian criminological positivism. Jorge Eduardo Coll was still in another chair, but Eusebio Gómez had died when I was in high school, I did not know him, nor Juan P. Ramos, who I think died when I was in my first year of college.

But no, I soon got into the criminal dogmatics of German reception. There were other professors; I did the seminar at the Institute of Criminal Law with Luis Jiménez de Asúa, and when years later I started teaching in Veracruz, I began by teaching the dogmatics of continental European criminal law.

In German criminal law, Hans Welzel sounded more realistic, although I was always suspicious of his ethicisation, so I never shared his concept of culpability, but the attraction came from his realism. I was never at all convinced by the neo-Kantianism of Mezger, and I was not wrong. In short, what I did much later was to apply the thesis of the logical-real structures to punishment and punitive power, which Welzel, of course, did not do, because his whole ethicising scheme would have collapsed. But this realist imprint, although quite Aristotelian, cannot be denied.

A quite intelligent penalist of ours – and the reactionary ones, by the way – used to say that finalism was dangerous because it opened the way to ‘Marxism’. But he was too shrewd, and that is why he never wrote it. Bayardo Bengoa wrote it in Uruguay. He was right in the sense that it opened the way to criminological criticism in criminal law, which would implode its idealistic dogmatics or force it to retreat into a hallucinated world, where criminal law is elaborated without the slightest qualm, imagining that punitive power responds to models of states that do not exist, such as the Kantian ethical or the Hegelian rational. That is why Bayardo could make criminal law on that basis, and at the same time be Minister of Justice for the Uruguayan dictatorship. He was awarded an honorary doctorate ‘de facto’ from the University of Buenos Aires during the dictatorship.

In any case, the realist imprint was quite overlooked in the Argentinian discussions, where it seemed that everything was reduced to knowing whether the ‘dolus’ was in the criminal type or in the culpability.

As for the figure of Francisco Laplaza, he was Dean of the Faculty of the University of Buenos Aires when I was a student. It was obviously the most reactionary faculty of that university and in general tremendously conservative. It was also the one that adopted the most retrograde positions in the face of what we could call ‘conservative progressivism’. It did not set any theoretical trends, because except for some essays, the best it had was an impeccable bilingual edition of Beccaria’s book. His pre-eminence was during the dictatorship, when he was the director of the Institute of Criminal Law and we were all kicked out of the faculty, including Ricardo Levene, Isidoro de Benedetti, Horacio S. Maldonado and, of course, me, who was teaching on the undergraduate programme. Laplaza was also a prosecutor and he asked me to nullify all my sentences as a first instance judge, with the clear purpose of having a ‘jury’ to dismiss me. I had to stop him with a documented defence. I can’t tell you anything about what happened during those years in the faculty, because I didn’t set foot in it. Anyway, I know that some professors used my ‘Manual’. When I returned to the University of Buenos Aires after the dictatorship, of course it was gone.
M.B.: If Argentina was the model of uncritical acceptance of the Italian positivist paradigm of criminology, or in the words of Gina Lombroso, the country where her father and his theories were most honoured, why was its influence on concrete criminal legislation so scarce? Only the laws of residence and social defence recognise this influence, but outside the criminal code. Properly speaking, they are not punitive laws. You once said that the figure of Rodolfo Moreno may be the explanation for why the spirit of Lombroso, so dominant in the whole Argentine society at the time, did not enter the criminal code. How can this phenomenon be explained and how can it be extended to the whole region?

R.Z.: Indeed, I believe that the one who saved us from that was Rodolfo Moreno, who was not a great criminal lawyer, but he was a great politician. The curse that no governor of the Province of Buenos Aires reaches the presidency of Argentina was also fulfilled with him. If Tejedor in his time, or Moreno in his, had reached the presidency of the Republic, perhaps our history would have been different. But it is not written to include hypotheticals.

I believe that Moreno and Rivarola, who had turned from Spencer to Kant, were the ones who prevented us from having a ‘peligrosista’ code (legislation under the threat of dangerousness), which unleashed the fury of the positivists. In the Senate, Ramos managed to put the word ‘dangerousness’ in article 41, and Coll and Gómez took advantage of their contacts with Justo to initiate a project that fortunately did not prosper, after the failed electric chair scheme, that Moreno himself derailed and that the conservative Chamber of Deputies never tried, thanks to him, despite the Senate’s half sanction. It seems to me that Rivarola was the ideologist and Moreno the politician, but they must have been an interesting duo.

M.B.: In your latest texts you speak of a new critical criminology situated here and now for Latin America. What would be the fundamental postulates on which future research should be based?

R.Z.: Returning a little to what I said before about what critical criminologists taught us, I believe that their criminology did not take care of genocides and for us that is crucial. Our colonial history is one of genocides, from the original colonialism to the ongoing drip genocide in the region (genocide that takes place slowly but systematically on the poorest classes of our countries), which is like a new Hiroshima and Nagasaki every time. Let us add up the deaths caused by violence, with some countries being world champions in homicide rates, with suicides, lethality due to selective health care, deficient sanitary campaigns, job insecurity, traffic insecurity, not to mention food shortages, and you will see that our underdevelopment – a product of the late colonialism to which we are subjected by organised financial macro-criminality – is a drip genocide in progress.

The punitive power in our region has always been predominantly informal and genocidal and yet we are here, so we survive and resist. The history of our colonialism is not a history of the vanquished, but of the victors, because in spite of everything, our cultural mosaic, formed by all those victimised and persecuted by the colonialist globalisation of the last five centuries, shows that we are alive and that we resist the punitive power of all the successive stages of colonialism.

Therefore, we need a criminology of our ‘being-here’, and what does this ‘Being-here’ show us? It confirms our survival and resistance, with all its different tactics, from the Maroon Indians and the ‘quilombos’ and ‘palenques’ to the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, from Túpac Amaru to the protests of these last months throughout the South American Pacific.

I believe that the pending task of our criminology of ‘Being-here’ is to investigate the genocidal puni-
tive power of our original colonialism, of oligarchic neo-colonialism, of national security, and from all that to extract the tactics of survival and resistance of our peoples. In other words our criminology should show us how we managed to continue our ‘being-here’, to gather that experience – which is a true cultural treasure – and apply it to the selection of the tactics that we must follow in resistance to the current late-colonialism.

It is not about a history, but about the recovery of an enormous experience that is necessary for us to stop the ongoing drip genocide. I believe that this is the pending task, which must be performed by us from the south, because genocide is not incorporated into the criminology of the ‘north’. In any case, our vision of the ‘south’ may well complete a vision of punitive power with the ‘north’ and, in this way, make one day a criminology of ‘Being-in-the-world’, because there are not two ‘worlds’, but a single reality seen from two perspectives.
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How to cite this article (APA– 7th ed.): Zaffaroni, E. (2021). Criminology in Latin America: A dialogue with Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni. [Interview by M. Bailone]. Criminological Encounters, 4(1), 134-144. doi:10.26395/CE21040109

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